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JOHN M. CONLEY *
The idea for this issue of Law and Contemporary Problems and the confer-
ence that preceded it arose from my work in judicial education over the last
dozen years.  Over that period, Duke Law School’s Private Adjudication Center
has sponsored an annual program called “Judging Science,” a week-long, inten-
sive seminar in the scientific method and its various applications for trial and
appellate judges from around the country.  The program was conceived by Paul
Carrington of Duke Law School and the late Maurice Rosenberg of Columbia.
I participated as a statistics instructor in the early years and over the last several
years have been the program’s director.
Over those dozen years, the single issue that has vexed the participating
judges more than any other is the relationship between causation in law and
causation in science.  Their vexation has been exacerbated, of course, by the le-
gal burdens imposed on them by the Daubert cases.1  Over and over again,
judges have expressed frustration with what they perceive to be science’s
equivocal, almost backhanded approach to causation: deciding whether A
caused B not by direct proof, but by excluding all other plausible hypotheses.
At the same time, they have ardently sought after ways to translate scientific
proof of causation into the law’s language of “more likely than not” and “be-
yond a reasonable doubt.”  They have rarely been pleased when my faculty
colleagues and I have tried to explain why a direct translation is simply not pos-
sible.  On more than one occasion, we have been accused, with considerable
warmth, of academic evasiveness.
Copyright © 2001 by John M. Conley
This foreword  is also available at http://www.law.duke.edu/journals/64LCPForeword.
* William Rand Kenan Jr. Professor of Law, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
1. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993); General Electric Co. v. Joiner,
522 U.S. 136 (1997); Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999).
FOREWORD_FMT.DOC 06/04/01  1:30 PM
2 LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS [Vol. 64: No. 4
I finally concluded that the charge, while fundamentally unfair, did have an
element of truth.  Perhaps both science and the law needed to confront directly
each other’s understanding of causation, to assess carefully and comprehen-
sively the similarities and differences between the two, and to survey promising
sites for building bridges.  My approach to this quandary was to triangulate: to
assemble a group of scientists, lawyers, and philosophers of diverse intellectual
experience to think about the problem from their own perspectives.  The whole,
I hoped, would be greater than the sum of the parts.  I believe that the effort
has paid off.
A collection such as this does not yield a single answer to the question of
“What is causation?”—and appropriately so, for there is no such answer.  It
does, however, illustrate vividly the multiplicity of ways in which people who
make and interpret the law, who think about its nature, and who create the sci-
entific evidence that the law consumes conceive of the answer.  By thus illumi-
nating the connections and disjunctions among these various perspectives, this
collection will, I hope, enhance the process of communication and understand-
ing between the law and the sciences.
The creation of this volume began in November 2000, with an editorial con-
ference at Duke Law School that was sponsored by the Private Adjudication
Center (“PAC”).  Prior to the conference, all of the authors posted preliminary
drafts on PAC’s website.  Then, over the course of two days, each paper was
presented formally, with extended opportunities for comment and discussion.
The finished products that appear in this volume embody each author’s reflec-
tion on that process.
Several of the papers take as their starting point the kinds of evidence that
scientists rely on to prove causation, and then raise questions about the law’s
reception of that evidence.  Carl F. Cranor, a philosopher, and environmental
toxicologist David A. Eastmond analyze the patterns of scientific evidence in
toxic tort cases and ask whether the law makes appropriate use of this evidence
in making its own judgments about causation.  They conclude that judicial igno-
rance of scientific causation, working in concert with the current rules for the
admissibility of scientific evidence and the traditional burdens of proof, can
cause courts to dismiss toxic exposure problems that scientists view as quite
real.  Statisticians David A. Freedman and Philip B. Stark consider the specific
example of the alleged relationship between swine flu vaccine and Guillain-
Barré Syndrome, with particular attention to the epidemiological concept of
relative risk.  Their subtle but persuasive critique and reanalysis of the under-
lying scientific data provide a strong reminder of how just how difficult (and
perilous) it can be for the law to translate scientific ideas of causation into its
own terms.  Douglas Crawford-Brown, a physicist who studies environmental
issues, assesses the use of scientific models of human health risk analysis in
framing legal policy.  He identifies two attributes of science that pose particular
problems for legal and political decisionmakers: the fact that science is properly
practiced by a community, rather than by autonomous and authoritative indi-
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viduals; and the related fact that science is a forward-looking, ongoing process
without definitive endpoints.
Other papers take the law’s perspective as their starting point.  Legal phi-
losophers Richard Fumerton and Ken Kress wrestle with a problem that has
vexed their discipline: whether it is possible to separate normative from non-
normative causal factors.  They examine recent efforts to go beyond the law’s
traditional reliance on “but for” causation by defining a category of “necessary
elements of a set of sufficient conditions” (“NESS”).  They find the NESS con-
cept promising but ultimately inadequate.  Joseph Sanders, a law professor and
scientific evidence scholar, and lawyer Julie Machal-Fulks address the question
of the admissibility of qualitative differential diagnosis testimony to prove spe-
cific legal causation in toxic tort cases.  Surveying an extensive body of case law,
they find that apparently inconsistent results can often be explained on the basis
of the courts’ willingness to factor their general evaluations of the strength of
the underlying science into their judgments on the admissibility of individual
expert opinions.  Laural L. Hooper, Joe S. Cecil, and Thomas E. Willging of the
Federal Judicial Center (the research arm of the federal courts) report on two
major practical efforts to assist courts in dealing with complex scientific evi-
dence.  They describe and evaluate the work of two court-appointed expert
panels charged with assessing whether breast implants cause systemic connec-
tive tissue disease.
Two other papers deal with specific communication problems between law-
yers and scientists.  David W. Barnes, a tort law specialist as well as an econo-
mist, discusses the propensity of some judges to try to mesh scientific calcula-
tions of statistical significance (which often produce numbers that look like
error rates of less than five percent) with the rough-and-ready fifty-one percent
probability often used to characterize the civil burden of persuasion.  Barnes
warns strongly against such oversimplification, stressing that legal decision-
makers simply cannot avoid understanding and evaluating scientific and statisti-
cal methods on their own terms.  On a related topic, statistician David W. Pe-
terson and I take up the particular problem of the p-value, a statistic that scien-
tists routinely calculate in deciding whether chance is a plausible explanation
for their observations.  We identify a number of situations in which courts can
be misled by the misuse of p-values, and argue for a change in the rules of dis-
covery to control such abuses.
Two pairs of authors report on their empirical studies of how the process of
causal reasoning actually works.  Social psychologists Barbara A. Spellman and
Alexandra Kincannon have conducted a series of experiments designed to as-
sess how lay people deal with difficult causal problems of the sort that often
come up in the law—for example, events with multiple sufficient causes.  They
find that in a variety of such situations, lay people not only sort out complex
causal conundrums in rational ways, they also arrive at legally correct judg-
ments without the “benefit” of legal instructions.  Lawrence M. Solan, a law
professor and linguist, and social psychologist John M. Darley have done an ex-
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perimental study of how people reason about “enabling torts” (cases in which,
for example, the defendant has left the keys in the ignition and someone steals
the car and gets into an accident, or has allowed a social guest to drink too
much and the guest causes injury while driving home).  Their results show that
people are inconsistent in their judgments about liability in such cases, often
merging the logically separable categories of enablement and causation into a
more general category of contribution.  Solan and Darley suggest that their re-
spondents’ judgments can help to explain a parallel confusion between enable-
ment and causation that permeates the tort case law.
Finally, two papers attempt to put the question of causation into far more
expansive contexts. Physician and medical historian Warren Newton looks at
the issue across time, reviewing centuries of tension between rationalism and
empiricism in the evolution of the modern practice of medical diagnosis.  His
paper strikingly illustrates the divisions within the scientific world that the law
too often idealizes as monolithic.  Anthropologist William M. O’Barr’s perspec-
tive is cross-cultural.  He reminds us that Western notions of causation, whether
legal or scientific, are culturally-derived folk categories rather than absolute
truths, making his point with reference to a series of famous ethnographic cases.
Readers should not expect to come away from this collection with a tran-
scendent definition of causation that will satisfy both scientists and lawyers.
What should emerge, however, is a refined sense of the dimensions of the
problem.  My hope is that these papers will materially improve the under-
standing of each side’s point of view, and thereby promote the communication
between law and science that is at present so awkward.  More specifically, I
hope that the judges whose queries stimulated this project will better appreciate
why scientists cannot speak about causation as lawyers do.  At the same time, I
hope that those scientists will see that there are reasons other than obtuseness
for the law’s frequent misunderstanding and occasional misuse of their findings.
